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Abstract 
In elicitation tasks, people are asked to make estimates under 
conditions of uncertainty but elicitors then interpret these 
estimates as if the estimator were certain of them. An analysis 
of people’s patterns of responding during the elicitation of 
uncertainty, indicates that there are markers of confidence 
incorporated into these estimates that can be used to predict 
the person’s true level of confidence. One such marker is the 
precision (number of significant figures) of the estimate. 
Analyses of elicited data show the expected positive 
relationships between accuracy, precision and explicit 
confidence and, further, that precision offers information 
beyond that of explicit confidence ratings. We then 
demonstrate the importance of incorporating this information 
on an overconfidence task, showing that it can account for a 
9% difference in calibration. 
Keywords: Number preference, confidence, precision, 
elicitation, judgment and decision making. 
Introduction 
Studies of human judgment typically make use of estimates 
of some quantity given by participants, with a view to 
assessing the "quality" of these estimates. However, exactly 
how to make this assessment is not always straightforward 
as people’s estimates can contain more information than just 
a numerical value. For example, imagine that you have 
asked two individuals how high Mt Everest is. The first 
answers “9km”; while the second responds “8925 metres”. 
Later you have the opportunity to check the true answer and 
find that Mt Everest is 8844.43m high (PRCSBSM, 2005). 
Which of the two is a better estimate? 
One answer, of course, is that the second estimate 
(8925m) is better as it missed the precisely measured value 
by only 80.57m whereas the first estimate missed by 
155.57m. In terms of human interactions, however, the 
answer is less clear. While the second answer is closer to the 
true value than the first, it is also far more precise –stating 
the height to the nearest metre. The first estimate, by 
comparison, it is stated only to the nearest kilometre. 
The inference a listener might draw from these different 
levels of precision is that the first speaker is giving an 
approximate height while the second is giving an exact 
height – an distinction referred to by Yaniv and Foster 
(1995) as “graininess”. Generally, the less precise an 
estimate is, then, the less confidence we expect the estimator 
to have in their estimate being precisely right. This 
conversational rule mimics the rules of measurement used in 
the physical sciences where values are given with an error 
range of ± half the smallest calibration of the measurement 
device. Thus, a ruler marked in millimetres yields 
measurements that are presumed to be accurate to ±0.5mm. 
Thinking in these, pragmatic terms (Sperber & Wilson, 
1986), one could conclude, therefore, that the second 
estimate is, in fact, worse. This is because it is precise to the 
nearest metre but the true value lies more than 80 metres 
beyond the 8924.5 to 8925.5m interval resulting from the 
addition of an appropriate error. The first estimate, by 
comparison, implies a range of 8.5 to 9.5km and the true 
value falls well within this.  
The conclusion to be drawn from the above is that the 
consideration of precision can alter our perceptions of 
accuracy. Although seemingly unremarkable, this has 
important implications for the way in which we should 
interpret estimates given by participants during elicitation 
procedures, as discussed below.  
Elicitation of Uncertainty 
The elicitation of uncertainty describes the process of 
converting a person’s subjective beliefs regarding uncertain 
events into a numerical form to allow easier analysis 
(Wolfson, 2001). Various techniques designed to do this are 
used where probabilistic forecasting is required in fields 
such as Petroleum Exploration (Attanasi & Schuenemeyer, 
2002), Hydrology (Krzysztofowicz, 2001) and Meteorology 
(Morgan & Keith, 1995). 
The technique most commonly used in the oil and gas 
industry, for example, is the elicitation of 80% confidence 
ranges (see, e.g., Hawkins, Coopersmith, & Cunningham, 
2002). Here the elicitee is asked to give a range of values 
such that they are 80% certain that the true value of 
whatever parameter they are estimating will fall within it. 
Overconfidence 
The common observation of people using elicitation 
techniques, however, is that people are overconfident 
(Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982) – that is, they 
give ranges that are too narrow, such that values fall outside 
their 80% ranges more than the expected 20% of times. 
Given this tendency of people to be overconfident in 
their estimates, it is not surprising that much of the literature 
on uncertainty elicitation relates directly to mechanisms for 
overcoming uncertainty or “debiasing” participants. Various 
techniques from simple advice to widen ranges  
(Lichtenstein, et al., 1982) through repeated feedback 
(Murphy & Winkler, 1977) to the use of probabilistic games 
(Hawkins, et al., 2002) are recommended. The common 
observation, however, is that such techniques reduce but do 
not eliminate overconfidence (Morgan & Henrion, 1990). 
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A particularly interesting observation from the 
overconfidence literature is that the strength of the effect is 
greatly impacted by format dependence (Juslin, 
Wennerholm, & Olsson, 1999). For example, the same 
participant will give a different answer when asked to 
generate a confidence interval than when asked to evaluate 
that same interval (Winman, Hansson, & Juslin, 2004). 
Thus, a person who has set ten 80% confidence ranges, 
when asked how many times the true value will fall within 
their specified ranges, may answer only “65%”. 
This discrepancy is generally taken to indicate a problem 
with the participant’s understanding of the statistical 
underpinnings of the processes. If they were accurately 
setting their 80% confidence intervals, they should expect 
approximately 80% of values to fall within those ranges but, 
instead they predict that fewer than this will. 
Winman et al (2004) provide a possible explanation for 
this, where they argue that it results from the statistical 
naivety of participants, relying on biased estimators of 
dispersion (Fiedler, 2000). A simulation of the effect, on 
overconfidence, of using sample variances to estimate 
population variance can be seen in Welsh, Begg, Bratvold 
and Lee (2004) where it is shown that sample sizes in the 
range of human short-term memory limitations do appear to 
lead to overconfident estimates of population dispersion. 
While this approach has the advantage of 
mathematically corresponding to people’s observed 
behavior, it also requires that people think in peculiarly 
statistical ways. Specifically, for overconfidence to be the 
result of sampling from memory, assumptions must be made 
about the nature of memory and recall that do not 
necessarily accord with mnemonic theory and experimental 
results (for a discussion of this, see, e.g., Bruza, Welsh, & 
Navarro, 2008). 
Precision in Elicited Values 
The difference between interval estimation and interval 
evaluation can also be considered in another way, invoking 
the concept of precision described above. To understand 
why this is, first it must be understood that people, when 
asked to estimate values, answer in a restricted fashion. 
Specifically, they show number preference (Baird, Lewis, & 
Romer, 1970; Plug, 1977), preferring to give answers that 
are integers and also multiples of 5 or 10.  
These number preferences are sometimes interpreted as 
resulting from their ease of use in the decimal system or 
other psychological preferences (Albers, 1999) and this does 
seem likely to account for part of the effect, at least, but it is 
also feasible that people use rounded, imprecise numbers 
because they are, implicitly, giving imprecise estimates. 
Consider a case where a participant gives a range of 
possible values for the parameter of interest of 100-500. 
Exactly how reasonable is it to believe that the end-points of 
this elicited range, which could theoretically take any value, 
both fell on multiples of 100 by chance? Rather, where 
participants repeatedly give these rounded numbers, 
interpreting these estimates as also reflecting an implicit 
measure of confidence makes it possible to give an 
alternative explanation of format dependence, as described 
in our case study below. 
Research Aims 
The initial aim of this research is to confirm our expectation 
that people will display number preferences due, in part at 
least, to a desire (implicit or explicit) to reflect their 
uncertainty about the magnitude of the value they are 
estimating. If people are, in fact, using imprecise numbers in 
this manner, it should lead to a number of observable 
tendencies. For example, assuming that confidence and 
accuracy are related, more accurate people should also be 
more precise in their estimates.  
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, we aim to show 
why people who use elicited values need to take this 
additional information into account when examining 
people’s elicited responses.  
Thus, analyses undertaken here tested whether a person’s 
tendency to use rounded numbers (i.e., multiples of 10, 100, 
etc) correlated with both the accuracy of, and their stated 
degree of confidence in, their estimate – the expectation 
being that people would be more accurate and confident 
when giving more precise answers. Then we examined a 
pre-existing data-set to demonstrate how including this 
effect alters our conclusions about the magnitude of one of 
the most studied cognitive biases, overconfidence. 
Pilot Work 
Prior to the current experiment, we ran two pilot studies 
looking at this effect. The first asked 36 University of 
Adelaide students (4 male, mean age = 22.7, SD = 4.8) to 
estimate answers to 20 general knowledge questions. The 
first 10 of these had no explicit confidence rating while the 
second 10 did. All questions had 4-digit answers. 
This study established that asking for an explicit 
confidence rating did not alter people’s use of precision but 
struck significant problems with the levels of confidence 
observed. People found the questions very difficult and their 
confidence ratings averaged less than 2 (on a 0 to 10 scale). 
As a result, while precision correlated with the accuracy of 
estimates at 0.51, the relationship between confidence and 
the other measures were very weak at 0.15 and 0.12 for 
precision and accuracy, respectively. 
To avoid this restricted range of confidence, a second 
analysis examined a small, pre-existing dataset, to test 
whether number preferences (precision) were observed in a 
memory task. The data-set was from an unpublished 
anchoring experiment in which 15 university graduates (5 
male, mean age = 31.5, SD = 7.4) had responded to 54 
questions (all with numerical answers but of varying 
magnitudes). This indicated that, when people had previous 
experience of the facts about which they were later asked,  
their confidence in their estimates was  much higher, but 
that they still used precision as a marker of accuracy 
(correlation of 0.34). Precision was also observed to have 
separate predictive power to the confidence ratings, with the 
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partial correlation between precision and accuracy 
remaining at 0.25 after controlling for confidence. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 40 university students and members of the 
general public, recruited in and around the University of 
Adelaide, 27 male, with a mean age of 25.4 (SD = 9.3). 
Participants were given a $10 book voucher for their 
participation, with an additional $20 voucher offered as a 
reward for the most accurate participant. 
Materials and Procedure 
Materials. 40 almanac-style questions of fact were selected 
from across a range of topics. All questions had numerical 
answers that were 4 digits in length (i.e., between 1000 and 
9999) and none ended in a zero. 
 
Procedure. Testing was divided into a learning and a 
testing phase – both computerized and presented via 
graphical user interfaces (GUIs) designed in Matlab.  
During the learning phase, participants were presented 
with all forty questions, rewritten as statements of fact. They 
were allowed to look at each of these for as long as they 
chose before continuing to the next but could not, thereafter, 
return to look at the same fact again. There was then a two 
minute break while the experimenter closed the learning 
GUI and opened the testing GUI. 
The testing GUI then presented 20 of the 40 questions 
(the same 20 for all participants), one at a time, asking 
participants to enter their answer to the question directly 
into the GUI and then to indicate how confident they were 
in that answer using a slider that took values from 0 to 10. 
The questions in the learning and testing phases were in 
the same order for all participants but the two phases had 
different question orders. Participants were tested 
individually and most completed the task within 30 minutes. 
Results 
Measures 
Participant performance was measured in three ways. First, 
their accuracy on the questions was measured – as the 
absolute percentage error in their estimates. This was 
assigned a negative value so that higher values correspond 
to higher accuracy. 
Second, their confidence in each estimate was recorded – 
this being simply their explicit confidence rating from 0 
(low confidence) to 10 (high confidence). 
Finally, the degree of precision at which they had 
answered the question was recorded. This measure was 
simply the number of zeros that their estimate ended in. 
Thus a fully precise answer, ending in a non-zero digit, was 
scored ‘0’, whereas an answer that was a multiple of ten 
scored ‘1’, and a multiple of one hundred ‘2’. Precision 
scores within the sample ranged from 0 to 3. These values 
were then inverted such that high values correspond to high 
precision and vice versa. 
Analyses 
Given that we had 40 participants all complete the same 
twenty questions, we aggregate data at the participant level 
and report, for example, the distribution of participants’ 
average accuracy across the 20 questions. Similarly, 
correlations between our measures of interest are calculated 
for each participant and the distributions of these discussed. 
Number Preferences 
The first question we asked of the data was: are people 
showing number preferences? That is, even in this 
experiment where none of the true answers that the 
participants saw ended in a zero, would people still report 
answers ending in zeros or would they, instead, always 
given fully precise responses? 
Figure 1 shows how often participants gave fully 
specified (to the last digit) responses to the 20 questions. 
Looking here, one can see that, despite the fact that all 
questions had answers specified to the last digit, there are 
strong preferences toward estimates ending in zeros. While 
there are seven participants in Figure 1 who always gave 
answers that were precise to the last digit (the peak at the far 
right), one can see that the majority of people gave some or 
even all of their answers rounded to the nearest ten (or 
hundred or thousand).The average number of fully precise 
answers per participant was 9.75 – slightly less than half. 
 
Figure 1. Histogram showing to how many of the twenty 
questions participants gave fully precise responses (i.e., no 
final zeros). 
 
This is, of course, far fewer than one would expect by 
chance – assuming a 1 in 10 chance of an estimate ending in 
a zero, the probability of seeing 410/800 estimates ending in 
zeros is vanishingly small, p ≈ 2.3x10-189 – so it seems 
uncontroversial to conclude that number preferences are 
observed in the sample. 
Accuracy, Confidence and Precision 
As an initial test of the relationships between accuracy, 
confidence and precision, we calculated rank-order 
correlations between the three variables for each participant. 
These are summarized in Figure 2. 
Looking at Figure 2, one sees relationships that are, 
generally, in the expected directions in all three subplots. 
Participants whose estimates were more accurate tended to 
be more confident in those answers (34 of 40 correlations 
being positive, mean ρ = .27). Similarly, people who gave 
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more precise answers tended to be more accurate (29 of 40 
correlations being positive, mean ρ = .22). Finally, 
confidence and precision are related in a straightforward 
manner – with high confidence tending to be partnered with 
high precision (31 of 40 correlations, mean ρ = .42). 
 
Figure 2. Histograms of rank order correlation strengths 
between each of Accuracy, Precision and Confidence for 40 
participants. 
 
In all cases, a sign test indicates that the probability of 
seeing so many positive correlations in the absence of a 
genuine effect is very low, p = 6.9x10-7, .001 and 9.1x10-5, 
respectively. 
There are, however, discrepancies in Figure 2 that need 
further explanation; specifically, the peaks at zero in 
subplots b) and c).  These are caused, primarily, by the 
minority of people who always gave precise responses and 
who, therefore, have a zero correlation between their 
precision scores and both accuracy and confidence. 
An important question to ask here, however, is whether 
these peaks represent those people who remembered the true 
answers and were, therefore, able to give highly accurate 
and precise answers or whether they reflect an alternative 
estimation strategy that avoids the rounded numbers 
preferred by most people. 
To establish this, we examined the accuracy and 
confidence of the participants within this subset of 
participants. While statistical analyses on so small a group 
(7 participants) are extremely unlikely to demonstrate a 
convincing difference, we noted that the mean error of the 
‘always precise’ subgroup was actually higher than that of 
the remainder of the sample (23.3% vs 12.6% error) and 
their confidence was lower (4.7 vs 5.1). That is, the 
members of the ‘always precise’ group were both less 
accurate and less confident. These effects are very large and 
very small, respectively, A = 0.95 and 0.52 (this is a non-
parametric, probability-based effect size measure which 
indicates the likelihood of a randomly chosen person from 
one group outperforming a randomly chosen person from 
the other group; see Ruscio, 2008, for a full explanation). 
Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that these ‘always 
precise’ people are not actually the most accurate but rather 
seem to have a different estimation strategy from the 
remainder of the sample. Rather than using rounding to 
represent their uncertainty, these people engage in what 
might be thought of as random number entry – entering 
seemingly precise but actually meaningless final digits when 
they aren’t sure of what the final digit should be. 
Of course, an alternative explanation might be that these 
people simply recognized that there were no values ending 
in zero in the learning phase. This is argued against by the 
pilot data, however, where a similar group was seen in 
experiments where some answers did end in zero. That is, 
even where zero was a possible value, some people seemed 
to indicate uncertainty by entering random strings of digits 
(such as runs across the keyboard – 123, etc). 
Confidence versus Precision 
A secondary question that needs to be asked is whether 
confidence and precision are, in fact, just two measures of 
the same thing – the person’s underlying confidence in their 
answer. Even if this were the case, of course, an 
understanding of how people use precision to flag their 
underlying confidence in an estimate is useful for those 
situations where an explicit confidence rating has not been 
gathered. Of greater interest, though, is whether, even with 
confidence ratings, examination of people’s use of precision 
adds further information. 
The observation above regarding the subgroup who do not 
use precision at all argues for this conclusion as, within that 
group, people’s confidence scores still varied despite their 
precision scores all being the same. That is, for at least some 
people, precision and explicit confidence are different. 
To test for any separate relationship between accuracy 
and precision, partial correlations were calculated, for each 
participant, between these variables, controlling for the 
effect of confidence. Figure 3 shows the distribution of 
partial correlations from our sample of 40 participants. 
 
Figure 3. Histogram showing 40 participants’ partial 
correlations between accuracy and precision, controlling for 
confidence. 
 Looking at Figure 3, one sees that, even controlling for 
confidence, the correlations between accuracy and precision 
remain mostly positive (27 of 40), which a sign test signals 
as unlikely in the absence of a positive relationship, p = 
.008. Excluding those people who never change their 
precision (the spike at zero in Figure 3), the average partial 
correlation between accuracy and precision is 0.18. That is, 
the results suggest a weak but consistent effect. By 
comparison, the average partial correlation between 
confidence and accuracy, controlling for precision, is only 
0.12 – with or without the ‘always precise’ subset of 
participants. 
Discussion 
The results of this experiment reconfirm those from the pilot 
work described above. Number preferences, in the form of 
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the precision at which people choose to answer a question, 
have clear implications for how accurate we should expect 
that answer to be and how confident a person is in it. 
While the strength of the correlations in our results are 
quite weak, we note that our experiment was an artificial 
situation where none of the true answers that the participants 
saw prior to testing ended in zero, creating a situation where 
the effects of precision would be weakest - as this provided 
the strongest test of the effect’s existence. 
We therefore expect that, in other experimental designs 
and, in particular, where uncertainty is greater, the effect 
will be magnified – as was observed in our first pilot study.  
Case Study: Overconfidence 
If, as the above results suggest, the majority of people use 
round numbers in a pragmatic manner to indicate the degree 
of confidence that they place in an estimate, then this has 
clear implications for decision making research where 
people give estimates under uncertainty.  
For example, following up on the example given in the 
introduction, if a person in an overconfidence task has given 
end points for an estimated range of 100 and 500, exactly 
how confident should we be that they intend for these values 
to be interpreted as precise? That is, when they say they are 
80% sure that the true value falls between 100 and 500, do 
they mean precisely that or something closer to “I am 80% 
sure that the true value falls within a range from something 
like 100 to something like 500”. 
Interpreting such responses in line with the second 
meaning requires a reconsideration of results from previous 
overconfidence experiments. For example, assuming the 
pragmatic rule from the natural science – that is, an estimate 
is good to one-half the smallest specified unit - we would 
have to acknowledge that a 100-500 range might, in the 
mind of its generator, include values as low as 50 or as high 
as 550. Therefore, if we fail to take into account the 
precision at which responses are given, we may 
inadvertently inflate overconfidence. 
By way of example, we applied this simple rule to a prior 
dataset (Welsh, Bratvold, & Begg, 2005) looking at 
overconfidence effects in 80% confidence intervals elicited 
from 123 petroleum industry professionals. This study 
initially concluded that the participants were overconfident, 
with only 42% of estimated 80% confidence ranges 
including the true value. 
Due to the high degree of uncertainty in the participants’ 
estimates, however, more than 95% of estimated ranges in 
this sample were bounded by imprecise estimates (multiples 
of 10, 100, 100, etc) and, as a result, when we applied the 
pragmatic rule of including one-half of the smallest 
specified unit to each end of the range, most ranges were 
widened. As a result, calibration increased by 9% (to 51%).  
The point of this is not that calibration increased – as it 
was almost certain to – but rather demonstrating how large 
an effect this can have in decision making under uncertainty 
and, thus, that experimenters need to consider this as a 
source of apparent overconfidence. Of particular interest is 
the fact that this difference is of similar magnitude to that 
observed by Winman et al (2004) when comparing people’s 
evaluation and generation of confidence intervals in 
calibration tasks. It, therefore, seems possible, given the 
above demonstration, that this effect is largely the result of 
researchers misinterpreting people’s responses. That is, if 
people interpret numbers given to them in an evaluation task 
as precise (as one might expect given the nature of the task) 
but naturally generate imprecise end-points for their own 
ranges, then this might account for the majority of the 
difference in ‘overconfidence’ between generated and 
evaluated ranges. 
While a 9% change in calibration seems modest, it should 
be kept in mind that this can equate to tens of millions of 
dollars in industrial decision making. Welsh, Begg and 
Bratvold (2007), for example, discuss the economic 
significance of overconfidence on an offshore oil and gas 
development project, noting that even a 5% change in 
calibration can change cost/profit estimates by more than 
$22 million. 
General Discussion 
The data from the experiment described herein (and both 
pilot studies) offer support for the idea that number 
preferences, in the form of the precision with which a 
person answers a question, may reflect that person’s 
underlying confidence in their estimates. More specifically, 
it seems that the majority of people use the precision of their 
estimates to convey some sense of how accurate they 
believe their estimates to be. 
Interestingly, the effect of precision, while clearly 
overlapping the information provided by explicit 
confidence, also carried additional information in the main 
study and both of our pilots. That is, even when an explicit 
confidence rating has been obtained, it remains beneficial to 
examine peoples’ precision if one wishes to understand how 
good an estimate they believe they have provided. 
This is affirmed by the results of our case study, which 
shows the marked difference that the inclusion of this 
information makes to the interpretation of data gathered in a 
typical overconfidence experiment. 
Future Research 
Given these findings, there are a number of directions that 
seem worthwhile pursuing. The first of these involves an 
area that we have skirted here – people’s meta-knowledge 
regarding confidence and their use of precision. That is, are 
people aware of the way in which they use precision as a 
marker? At this point, we would predict that the answer is: 
no; because if people were aware of their use of imprecise 
numbers then one would expect precision and explicit 
confidence to be measuring exactly the same thing, which 
appears not to be the case. Thus, consideration of number 
preferences seems to offer a method for gaining insight into 
metacognitive processing in future research. 
A secondary question revolves around the use of 
multiples of 5, which are also known to be 
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disproportionately used in estimation tasks. While we did 
not include these – as several of our answers ended in “5” - 
this additional number preference should be taken into 
account in future to truly nail down the effect. 
We also need to look at the opposite face of the pragmatic 
conversation informed by peoples’ use of precision. That is, 
having established that people use precision as a marker of 
confidence, we need to confirm whether other people 
accurately interpret these numbers. 
More generally, our results point to a need for 
consideration of individual differences in decision making. 
Cognitive biases like overconfidence are often reported as 
group effects but a reconsideration of what is happening at 
the individual level can shed light on the processes giving 
rise to these biases (see, e.g., Welsh & Navarro, 2007). 
Conclusion 
People use the precision of their estimates as a marker of 
how accurate they believe they are. Given this, researchers 
relying on elicited values need to take this effect into 
account if we are to understand the responses we are given.  
In particular, it seems likely that the degree of 
overconfidence in elicited ranges may have been over-
estimated as a result of researchers not paying enough 
attention to the pragmatic aspects of the communication 
between researchers and participants. 
To paraphrase Inigo Montoya (from The Princess Bride): 
“That number, I do not think it means what you think it 
means.” 
Acknowledgments 
MBW and SHB are supported through ExxonMobil and 
Santos’ funding of the Improved Business Performance 
group at the ASP. DJN is supported by an ARC Discovery 
Grant Fellowship (DP0773794). The authors would like to 
thank Atanu Saha for his assistance in collecting the data. 
References 
Albers, W. (1999). Prominence theory as a tool to model 
boundedly rational decisions. In G. Gigerenzer & R. Selten 
(Eds.), Bounded rationality: the adaptive toolbox. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press. 
Attanasi, E. D., & Schuenemeyer, J. H. (2002). Some aspects of 
resource uncertainty and their economic consequences in 
assessment of the 1002 area of the Arctic National Wildlife 
Refuge. Natural Resources Research, 11(2), 109-120. 
Baird, J. C., Lewis, C., & Romer, D. (1970). Relative frequencies 
of numerical responses in ratio estimation. Perception and 
Psychophysics, 6, 78-80. 
Bruza, B., Welsh, M. B., & Navarro, D. J. (2008). Does Memory 
Mediate Susceptibility to Cognitive Biases? Implications of the 
Decision-by-Sampling Theory. In V. Sloutsky, B. Love & K. 
McRae (Eds.), Proceedings of the 30th Annual Conference of 
the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 1498-1503). Austin, TX: 
Cognitive Science Society. 
Fiedler, K. (2000). Beware of samples! A cognitive-ecological 
sampling approach to judgment biases. Psychological Review, 
107, 659-676. 
Hawkins, J. T., Coopersmith, E. M., & Cunningham, P. C. (2002). 
Improving stochastic evaluations using objective data analysis 
and expert interviewing techniques. Paper presented at the 
Society of Petroleum Engineers 78th Annual Technical 
Conference and Exhibition, San Antonio, Texas. 
Juslin, P., Wennerholm, P., & Olsson, H. (1999). Format 
dependence in subjective probability calibration. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 
25, 1038-1052. 
Krzysztofowicz, R. (2001). The case for probabilistic forecasting 
in hydrology. Journal of Hydrology, 249, 2-9. 
Lichtenstein, S., Fischhoff, B., & Phillips, L. D. (1982). 
Calibration of probabilities: the state of the art to 1980. In D. 
Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky (Eds.), Judgment under 
Uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Morgan, M. G., & Henrion, M. (1990). Uncertainty: a guide to 
dealing with uncertainty in quantitative risk and policy analysis. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Morgan, M. G., & Keith, D. W. (1995). Subjective judgements by 
climate experts. Environmental Science and Technology, 29(10), 
468A-476A. 
Murphy, A. H., & Winkler, R. L. (1977). Reliability of subjective 
probability forecasts of precipitation and temperature. Applied 
Statistics, 26(1), 41-47. 
Plug, C. (1977). Number preferences in ratio estimation and 
constant-sum scaling. American Journal of Psychology, 90(4), 
699-704. 
PRCSBSM (2005). Mt Qomolangma stands at 8844.43 (Peoples' 
Republic of China State Bureau of Surveying and Mapping) 
Retrieved 8th December, 2005, from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mt_Everest. 
Ruscio, J. (2008). A probability-based measure of effect size: 
robustness to base rates and other factors. Psychological 
Methods, 13(1), 19-30. 
Sperber, D., & Wilson, D. (1986). Relevance: communication and 
cognition. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Welsh, M. B., Begg, S. H., & Bratvold, R. B. (2007). SPE 110765: 
Modeling the economic impact of cognitive biases on oil and 
gas decisions. Proceedings of the Society of Petroleum 
Engineers 83rd Annual Technical Conference and Exhibition. 
Welsh, M. B., Begg, S. H., Bratvold, R. B., & Lee, M. D. (2004). 
SPE 90338: Problems with the elicitation of uncertainty. 
Proceedings of the Society of Petroleum Engineers 80th Annual 
Technical Conference and Exhibition, Houston, Texas: SPE. 
Welsh, M. B., Bratvold, R. B., & Begg, S. H. (2005). SPE 96423 - 
Cognitive biases in the petroleum industry: impact and 
remediation. Proceedings of the Society of Petroleum Engineers 
81st Annual Technical Conference and Exhibition. 
Welsh, M. B., & Navarro, D. J. (2007). Seeing is believing: priors, 
trust and base rate neglect. In D. S. McNamara & J. G. Trafton 
(Eds.), Proceedings of the 29th Meeting of the Cognitive Science 
Society (pp. 701-706). Austin, Texas: Cognitive Science 
Society. 
Winman, A., Hansson, P., & Juslin, P. (2004). Subjective 
probability intervals: how to reduce overconfidence by interval 
evaluation. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory and Cognition, 30(6), 1167-1175. 
Wolfson, L. J. (2001). Elicitation of probabilities and probability 
distributions. In E. Science (Ed.), International Encyclopedia of 
the Social Sciences (pp. 4413-4417): Elsevier Science. 
Yaniv, I., & Foster, D. D. (1995). Graininess of judgment under 
uncertainty: an accuracy-informativeness trade-off. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 124(4), 424-432. 
1526
